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COMMENSURABILITY AND CRIME
PREVENTION: EVALUATING FORMAL
SENTENCING STRUCTURES AND
THEIR RATIONALE*
ANDREW VON HIRSCH**
I.

INTRODUCTION

It scarcely is news that a number of American jurisdictions' have
moved, or are moving, toward adoption of formal sentencing structures-by which I mean laws, rules, or guidelines that provide explicit
and detailed guidance on how severely convicted offenders should be (or
should ordinarily be) punished.2 Researchers have begun to evaluate
* The reearch on which this Article is based was supported by the Project on Strategies
for Determinate Sentencing, funded by grants (nos. 78-NI-AX-0081/2) from the National
Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department ofJustice. Points of view stated in this Article are
those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the
funding agency.
I am indebted to my colleagues Martin Forst, Kathleen Hanrahan, Sheldon Messinger,
John Monahan, Julia Mueller, and Richard Sparks for their helpful comments on drafts of
this Article.
** Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey. LL.B.,
Harvard University, 1960; A.B., Harvard University, 1956.
I Two states (Minnesota and Pennsylvania) have sentencing guidelines established by a
sentencing commission, and a third (Washington) is now in the process of writing such guidelines. A number of other states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, New
Jersey, New Mexico, and North Carolina) have detailed, legislatively-prescribed sentencing
standards. Still other jurisdictions (the federal system, Oregon, Florida, New York,
Oklahoma, and Georgia) have parole release guidelines prescribing specific terms or ranges of
terms of confinement before release on parole. For a summary and analysis of these systems,
see von Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate Penalty Systems in America: An Overview, 27 CRIME &
DELINQ. 289 (198 1) [hereinafter cited as von Hirsch & Hanrahan, DeterminatePenalty Sstems].
2 A "determinate" penalty system is one which (I) has rules providing detailed guidance
on the quantum of punishment, and (2) has procedures designed to notify imprisoned offenders early of their expected dates of release. Id. at 294-96. By a "formal sentencing structure" I
mean any system having the first feature-whether or not it has the second feature of an early
time-fix. This includes (1) legislatively-prescribed determinate sentencing systems, (2) courtprescribed sentencing guidelines, (3) sentencing guidelines written by specialized rulemakers
such as sentencing commissions, and (4) guidelines on duration of confinement written by
parole boards. The definition covers both systems which prescribe a range as the normally
recommended sanction and those which set forth a fixed point as the recommended disposition. Such schemes might either have been written from a historical perspective to reflect
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these efforts. 3
The problem with conducting these evaluations is that a multiplicity of possible sentencing rationales are involved: deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, or desert. The degree of a system's "success" may
thus vary according to which of these conceptions, or which combination of these conceptions, is used as the basis of the judgment. Not all of
these conceptions, moreover, are aimed at crime-control so as to permit
traditional evaluations of the system's effectiveness in preventing criminal behavior. Desert, especially, is addressed to ethical issues concerning
the justice of the sentencing rules. By what standards, then, should evaluation proceed?
This Article addresses this question. I shall, first, suggest some general principles for evaluating a formal sentencing structure in desert
terms. Next, I suggest how such a structure's rationale can be identified;
that is, what specific features distinguish desert-oriented features of
guidelines from those emphasizing more utilitarian goals (particularly,
incapacitation). In describing these principles of evaluation, the focus
will be on the task of a "jurisprudential" evaluator who examines a formal sentencing structure as it is written. 4 I shall, however, touch upon
issues which more empirically-concerned investigators might consider in
examining the impact that such sentencing structures have on the
quanta and distribution of punishments actually inflicted.
Following this outline, Parts II-IV of the Article will sketch the
main desert requirements, describe the still-to-be resolved problems of a
desert rationale, and suggest how a system might be assessed in desert
terms. The two parts thereafter, V and VI, examine the structural differences in a sentencing scheme that indicate whether it emphasizes desert or incapacitation.
existing sentencing practice, or have been developed prescriptively to reflect aims of the
rulemakers' own choosing. All these systems provide a systematic body of norms for determining the quantum of punishment to be imposed on convicted persons. Id. All might be evaluated in the manner suggested in this Article.
3 See, e.g., MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE

(1982); Brewer,
Beckett & Holt, Determinate Sentencing in California.- The First Year's EAperience, 18 J. RESEARCH
CRIME & DELINQ. 200 (1981).
4 I have attempted two such analyses of particular jurisdictions. One, dealing with Minnesota's sentencing guidelines, is von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelinesfor Sentencing.- The Critical
Choicesfor the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 164 (1982) [hereinafter cited as von Hirsch, ConstructingGuidelinesforSentencing]. The other, examining California's Determinate Sentencing Law, is A. von Hirsch & J. Mueller, California's Determinate
Sentence Law: An Analysis of Its Structure (Dec. 1972) (unpublished manuscript).
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
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II.

A.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF DESERT

THE COMMENSURATE-DESERTS

PRINCIPLE AND ITS RATIONALE

The fundamental principle of desert in punishing convicted persons
is that the severity of the punishment should be commensurate with the
seriousness of the offender's criminal conduct. 5 The focus of the commensurate-deserts principle is on the gravity ofpast conduct, not on the
likelihood of future behavior; this retrospective orientation distinguishes
desert from the crime-control goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. The criterion for judging whether a penalty is deserved is
whether it fairly reflects the gravity of the criminal conduct of which the
defendant has been convicted, rather than its effectiveness in preventing
future crimes by the defendant or other potential offenders.
The rationale of the principle may be stated as follows. Punishment
involves blame; it is a defining characteristic of punishment that is not
merely unpleasant (so are many other kinds of state intervention) but
also characterizes the person punished as a wrongdoer who is being censured or reproved for his or her criminal act. The severity of the punishment connotes the amount of blame: the sterner the punishment, the
greater the implicit censure. The amount of punishment therefore
ought to comport, as a matter of justice, with the degree of blamewor6
thiness of the offender's criminal conduct.
The principle of commensurate-deserts addresses the question of allocation of punishments-that is, how much to punish convicted offenders. This allocation question is distinct from the issue of the general
justiftcation of punishment-namely, why the legal institution of punishment should exist at all. In arguing that the commensurate-deserts principle is a requirement of justice, one need not adopt the view that
reprobation of wrongdoing is the only reason for the existence of the
criminal sanction. It may exist to discourage crime as well as to censure
as deserved. 7 But punishment, once established for whatever reason,
necessarily implies blame. It therefore ought in fairness to be distributed among convicted offenders in a manner that is consistent with the
amount of implicit blame.8
5 A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 66-76 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DOING JUSTICE]. For a summary of the desert model and the other sentencing
theories influential today, see von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Sentencing Theoy, 42 MARYLAND L. REV. 6 (1983).
6 DOING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 71-74.
7 Id. at 45-55. For my current views, see von Hirsch, "Neoclassicism,"Proportionalityand the
RationaleforPnishment: Thoughts on the ScandinavianDebate, 29 CRIME & DELINO. (1983) (forthcoming) [hereinafter cited as von Hirsch, "Neoclassicism"].
8 DOING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 45-55.
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PARITY,

ORDINAL PROPORTIONALITY, AND CARDINAL
PROPORTIONALITY

The principle of commensurate-deserts involves three requirements
that may be separated for purposes of analysis. The first of these is parity, in the desert sense: 9 defendants whose criminal conduct is equally
blameworthy should be punished with equal severity. The second is ordinal proportionality: the ranking and spacing of penalties relative to
each other should reflect the comparative gravity of the criminal conduct involved. The third is cardinal proportionality: at all points on
the penalty scale, there should be a reasonable proportion maintained
between the quantum of punishment and the gravity of the conduct.
I.

Desert-parity

The principle of commensurate-deserts permits differences in severity of punishment among offenders only to the extent these differences
reflect variations in the blame justly due them. When offenders have
been convicted of crimes of equal seriousness, they therefore deserve
punishments of the same severity-unless one can identify special factors (i.e., aggravating and mitigating circumstances) that render the offense, in the particular context in which it occurred, more or less
deserving of blame than would normally be the case.' 0
Some writers, such as Norval Morris," have argued against the
parity requirement. They contend that desert should be considered only
for setting broad upper and lower bounds on the severity of penalties,
and that within these bounds the sentence should be determined on util9 Any theory of justice calls for equal treatment of equals. The question is the criterion
of equality: equal in what respect? On a desert theory, the criterion is the blameworthiness of
the offender's criminal conduct: those whose conduct is equally blameworthy ought to be
punished equally.
10 In DOING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 72-74, the argument for the parity requirement is
spelled out as follows:
Concededly, it is easier to discern gross excess in lenience or severity than to decide
on a specific proportion between a crime and its punishment. But, . . . the [commensurate-deserts] principle is infringed when disparate penalties are imposed on equally deserving offenders. If A and B commit a burglary under circumstances suggesting similar
culpability, they deserve similar punishments; imposing unequal sanctions on them for
utilitarian ends--even within some outer bounds of proportionality . . .- still unjustly
treats one as though he were more to blame than the other. ...
Equity is sacrificed when the principle [of parity] is disregarded, even when done for
the sake of crime prevention. Suppose there are two kinds of offenses, A and B, that are
of approximately equal seriousness; but that offense B can more effectively be deterred
through the use of a severe penalty. Notwithstanding the deterrent utility of punishing
offense B more severely, the objection remains that the perpetrators of that offense are
being treated as though they are more blameworthy than the perpetrators of offense Aand that is not so if the crimes are of equivalent gravity.
11 Morris, Punishment, Desert, and Rehabilitation, in SENTENCING 257-71 (H. Gross & A. von
Hirsch eds. 1981).
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itarian grounds. 12 The problem with relegating desert to an outer limit
in this fashion' 3 is explaining how there justly can be even modest differences in the severity of blame-ascribing sanctions among those whose
conduct is assumed to be equally blameworthy. To justify the unequal
punishment of the equally deserving, Morris is forced to argue that
4
equality is not one of the important requirements of justice.'
For present purposes, suffice it to say that the parity requirement is
one of the distinguishing features of a desert-oriented rationale15-- one
that marks it off from competing conceptions such as Morris' more utilitarian view.16 Parity is thus an important dimension to look for when
evaluating formal sentencing structures from a desert perspective.
2. Ordinal Proportionality
Ordinal proportionality is the requirement that the ranking of severity of penalties should reflect the seriousness-ranking of the criminal
conduct. Punishments are to be ordered on the scale so that their relative severity corresponds to the comparative blameworthiness of the conduct. This requirement restricts the extent to which the arrangement of
7
penalties on the scale may be varied internally for utilitarian purposes.'
Imposing exemplary penalties for burglaries to bring a halt to a recent
wave of those crimes, for example, will throw the ranking of offenses out
of kilter unless other penalties are adjusted accordingly.
Ordinal proportionality involves a further requirement of spacing.
The size of the increment from one penalty to another should reflect, in
relation to the dimensions of the whole scale, the size in the step-up in
seriousness from one species of criminal conduct to another.' 8 The ranking and spacing of penalties is thus a second major dimension for evaluating penalty systems from a desert perspective.
12 This is also the view taken in ABA TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES &
PROCEDURES, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (1979). See also M. SHERMAN
& G. HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA: CHOOSING THE FUTURE 89-101, 105-06

(1981); Coffee, RepressedIssues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability, and Equality in the Era of
the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L. REV. 976 (1978).
13 My objections to Morris' view of desert as an outer limit are elaborated in von Hirsch,
UtilitarianSentencing Resuscitated- The American Bar Association'sSecond Report on CriminalSentencing, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 772 (1981) [hereinafter cited as von Hirsch, UtilitarianSentencing];see
also von Hirsch, Book Review, 131 U. PA. L. REV. (1983) (forthcoming).
14 Morris, supra note 11, at 267. My reply to Morris' claims about equality is set forth in
von Hirsch, UtilitarianSentencing, supra note 13, at 783-89.
15 See, e.g., DOING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 66-76; J. KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT

(1973); R.

SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT

(1979).

For further bibliography, see SENTENCING, supra note 11, at 189.
16 For further discussion of Morris' position, see inf/a notes 63 and 87.
17 A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE: RETENTION, REFORM
OR ABOLITION? 17-18 (1979); DOING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 90-91.
18 DOING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 91.
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CardizalProportionality

Cardinal proportionality is the requirement that a reasonable proportion be maintained between the absolute levels of punishment and
the seriousness of the criminal conduct. 1 9 It refers not to the internal
architecture of the scale, but to its anchoring points and overall magnitude. Even where penalties on the scale have been ranked in the order
of the crimes' seriousness, the scale may infringe cardinal proportionality if its overall severity levels have been sufficiently inflated or deflated.
The complexities of these issues are discussed below.
III.

PARTIALLY UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN DESERT THEORY

Assessing a penalty system from a desert perspective thus involves
asking whether the system satisfies the foregoing requirements of parity,
ordinal proportionality, and cardinal proportionality. The assessment is
complicated, however, by the presence of several partially unresolved
issues in desert theory. Let us turn next to these issues, and see what is
and is not understood about them.
A.

CRITERIA FOR SERIOUSNESS

Analytically, the seriousness of criminal conduct has two major
components: harm and culpability.20 Harm refers to the degree of injury done or risked by the act. Culpability refers to the factors of intent,
motive, and circumstance that bear on the actor's blameworthiness-for
example, whether the act was done with knowledge of its consequences
or only in negligent disregard of them, or whether, and to what extent,
the actor's criminal conduct was provoked by the victim's own
21
misconduct.
Marvin Wolfgang has argued that the criteria for seriousness
should be developed using empirical studies of popular perceptions of
the gravity of offenses.2 2 Beginning with Wolfgang's and Thorsten Sellin's work in 1964, several surveys have measured the public's perceptions of seriousness of offenses and found that people from different
walks of life give similar ratings to the gravity of common acts of fraud,
19 Id. at 91-94.
20 Id. at 79-83. For a discussion of the relative weight given harm as opposed to risk of
harm, see Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on Results of Conduct in the
CriminalLaw, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497 (1974).
21 Culpability, in turn, affects the assessment of harm. An individual should thus be held
responsible only for the foreseeable consequences of his own acts. Unforeseeable consequences, or the harm wrought by others who choose to commit similar criminal acts, should
not be included in the assessment of harm. DOING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 80-81.
22 Wolfgang, Seriousness of Crime and a Poliy ofJuvenileJustice, in DELINQUENCY, CRIME,
AND SOCIETY 267-86 (J. Short ed. 1976).
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theft and violence.2 3 If this approach to rating seriousness were taken,
therefore, considerable data would be available for the task.
It can be argued, however, that this approach is conceptually
flawed. Harm in criminal conduct, Richard Sparks has suggested, 24 depends not on what people think are the consequences and risks of criminal conduct, but on the actual consequences and risks. To the extent
the public either overestimates or underestimates the injury done or
risked by various criminal acts, surveys of popular perceptions will fail
to provide a sound basis for rating the gravity of crimes.
Sparks has proposed that seriousness-ratings should rely instead on
empirical studies of the type and degree of injury (or risk of injury) typically associated with various types of crime.2 5 Traditional victimization
studies have been more concerned with the incidence of criminal acts
than with the type and extent of typical consequences. 26 While such
studies provide some data about the shorter-term consequences of being
victimized (e.g., the type and extent of property loss, personal injury,
and loss of earnings), a more systematic analysis of short and longer term
consequences is needed.
Such .an empirical inquiry into criminal harm must be supplemented by value judgments. Different crimes may injure different interests: one crime primarily affects property, another privacy, another
personal safety. It will therefore be necessary to decide on the priority
that should be assigned those various interests, and more thought is
needed on how these priorities could be established. One way might be
to give priority to those interests which must be protected in order for the
individual to be able to exercise other choices. 2 7 There remains also the
other element in seriousness: the offender's culpability for the acts he
commits-in regard to which moral judgments are unavoidable. All
these value dimensions in the rating of seriousness have yet to be examined in systematic fashion.
While these issues are being explored, however, the seriousness of
crimes can be graded in approximate fashion through the exercise of
common sense. At least as far as typical crimes of theft, force, and fraud
23

T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG,

THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964). For more

recent studies, see R. SPARKS, H. GENN & D. DODD, SURVEYING VICTIMS: A STUDY OF THE
MEASUREMENT OF CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION ch. 7 (1977); Turner, Introducion to Reprint Edilion, in T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, supra, at v-xxi (reprint ed. 1978).

24 Sparks developed this view in an unpublished presentation to the Conference on Penal
Desert held at Sterling Forest Conference Center, Tuxedo, N.Y., on November 19-21, 1978.
25 Id.
26 For a useful summary and analysis of recent victimization studies, see Sparks, Surveys of
Victimization -An
OptimisticAssessment, in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE 1-60 (M. Tonry & N. Morris eds. 1981).
27 See, e.g., Kleinig, Crime and the Concept of Harm, 15 AM. PHIL. Q. 27 (1978).
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are concerned, one can develop some rough idea of their likely consequences by using the statutory description of the crime coupled with
available common knowledge about such crimes. One can also make
common-sense moral judgments about the importance of the rights and
interests invaded by different species of crime. One can grade culpability at least according to whether intentional or negligent conduct is involved. Thus, in assessing a formal sentencing structure, the
appropriate question to ask is: to what extent has there been a conscientious effort to make such common-sense judgments about the gravity of
offenses? To determine whether there has been such an effort, several
matters should be considered.
1. Has the system explicitly rated the seriousness of crimes? Several determinate-penalty systems have adopted numerical seriousnessgrades. Minnesota, for example, has rated offenses on a ten-point seriousness scale.28 Other systems have no such rankings. California simply
assigns a presumptive penalty to each of the various statutory crimes,
without any explicit grading of the seriousness of crimes.2 9 An explicit
seriousness rating helps the rulemaker, as well as the evaluators, to check
whether a system is meeting parity and ordinal proportionality
requirements.
2. In grading offenses, has the rulemaking agency made its own
conscientious judgment on the merits as to their seriousness? Or has the
grading system merely been borrowed from somewhere else? Some jurisdictions adopted the pre-existing statutory gradations of maximum pen30
alties as the offense rankings for the new sentencing guidelines or rules.
The trouble with this approach is that those statutory gradations were
designed for a wholly different purpose. 3' Several jurisdictions-Minnesota and Oregon, for example-have adopted seriousness gradations
designed for the special purpose of their formal sentencing rules. The
rulemaker (the sentencing commission in Minnesota, an advisory commission together with the parole board in Oregon) adopted its grading
28 von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelinesfor Sentencing, supra note 4, at 196.
29 CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 1170(a)(2) (West Supp. 1982).

30 This is true, for example, of Indiana's and Illinois' determinate sentencing codes. Indiana bases its presumptive sentences on the felony classification of offenses. For a discussion of
this and other problems of the Indiana statute, see Clear, Hewitt & Regoli, Distcreton and the
Determinate Sentence: Its Distribution, Control, and Eect on Time Served, 24 CRIME & DELINQ. 428
(1978); von Hirsch, The New Indiana Sentencing Code.- Is it IndeterminateSentencing?, in ANATOMY
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A SYSTEMS OVERVIEW 143-56 (C. Foust & D. Webster eds. 1980)

[hereinafter cited as von Hirsch, The New Indiana Sentencing Code].
31 In a formal sentencing structure, the seriousness-ratings are used to help determine the
recommended penalty or range of penalties; and that recommended disposition is meant to be
the disposition for the normal or typical case for that offense. The traditional statutory maximum, on the other hand, is not concerned with the typical case, but instead deals with the
highest permissible penalty for the worst case.
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system after debating the seriousness of the various crimes at considera32
ble length.
3. Has the rulemaker given explicit reasons for its seriousness ratings? The rating choice becomes more rational when the rater tries to
identify what he or she believes to be the interests threatened by various
crimes and tries to assess and explain which interests are to be regarded
as the more important. Generally, this has not been attempted in sys33
tematic fashion in the formal sentencing rules established to date.
B.

CRITERIA FOR JUDGING PUNISHMENTS' SEVERITY

In order to link the seriousness of offenses to the severities of punishment, one needs criteria for judging how severe or lenient various punishments are. Leslie Sebba 34 has attempted to develop a scale of severity
by a technique similar to that used by Sellin and Wolfgang for seriousness, namely, to survey popular perceptions of the severity of different
kinds of punishments. This research revealed considerably less consensus than the Sellin-Wolfgang seriousness research has shown. Moreover,
there are conceptual difficulties in relying upon such research. If those
surveyed have not experienced the punishment and believe themselves
unlikely to experience it, their beliefs may be wildly inaccurate, or may
be influenced by attitudes of indifference toward others' suffering. For
example, to the extent the respondents are ignorant of the real pains and
deprivations of imprisonment, they will underrate the severity of prison
terms.
Surveys of convicts' and of ex-convicts' perceptions of the severity
of various penalties may be more illuminating, because those respondents have some experience with such sanctions and are not indifferent
to their own suffering. But such data are not yet available. 35 Perhaps,
severity would best be measured by determining what punishments do
to people in fact; for example, what kinds of opportunity-loss and
psychic deprivations they typically inflict. This research would be difficult and has not yet been attempted in any systematic fashion.
32 For discussion of the technique for rating crimes' seriousness used by Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines Commission, see von Hirsch, Constructing GuidelinesforSentencing, supra note
4, at 197-99. The seriousness ratings used by the Oregon Parole Board in its parole release
guidelines are summarized in Taylor, In Search of Equil: The Oregon Parole Matrix, 43 FED.
PROBATION 52 (1979).
33 See von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelinesfor Sentencing, supra note 4, at 197-99.

34 Sebba, Some Explorations in the Scaling ofPenalties, 15 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQ.
247 (1978).
35 One study that directly assesses prisoners' severity perceptions is a survey of prisoners at

Rahway State Prison in New Jersey. P. Shelly & R. Sparks, Crime and Punishment (unpublished paper presented at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology,
Nov. 1980). Shelly and Sparks feel, however, that substantial further inquiry is needed.
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The absence of such data complicates the task of comparing severities of different kinds of sanctions---e.g., comparing fines with probationary sentences, or probationary sentences with short jail terms. The
formal sentencing structures adopted in this country to date, however,
primarily concern the use of confinement in state prisons. For prison
sanctions, two simplifying assumptions seem appropriate: (1) Imprisonment is more severe than alternative sanctions; (2) the severity of different terms of imprisonment can be compared by comparing their
durations.
Both assumptions are, concededly, oversimplifications. The first is
true only if one sets aside the death penalty; even then, short stints in
state prison may be comparable in severity with county jail terms and
with probation under onerous conditions. The second assumption disregards the diversity of living conditions in different institutions; a longer
term in a more humane, less regimented facility may be comparable in
severity to a shorter term in a worse or more harshly run one. Nevertheless, these assumptions accord with common sense-and are at least
crude approximations of reality.
C.

RELEVANCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS

In assessing an offender's deserts, is it appropriate to consider
whether or not he has a record of prior convictions? Here, some disagreement exists among desert theorists.
George Fletcher 36 and Richard Singer 37 have maintained that the
presence or absence of prior convictions is irrelevant to an offender's
deserts. The person has been punished already for his prior convictions,
and hence those convictions should not affect the quantum of his deserved punishment for the current crime.
My own view 38 has been that first offenders deserve to be penalized
somewhat less harshly than those previously convicted. Punishment, I
argue, 39 not only entails a judgment that the behavior is wrong, but
involves moral disapproval directed at the actor for that wrong. The
first offender's plea for reduced punishment addresses the inference that
is made from (1) the judgment about the wrongfulness of the act, to (2)
36 G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 460-66 (1978); see also Fletcher, The Recidivist Prenium, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1982, at 54.
37 R. Singer, supra note 15, at 67-74.
38 von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REV. 591 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions].
39 In DOING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 84-88, I had argued that first offenders deserve to be
penalized less because (given conduct of equal harmfulness) a first offense suggests a lower
degree of culpability than a second or third. I subsequently became dissatisfied with this
culpability argument, and hence shifted to the rather different account set forth in von
Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions, supra note 38.

1983]

SENTENCING STRUCTURES

the judgment of disapproval directed at the actor. 40 On this view, the
absence of a prior criminal record would have a modest severity-reducing role: a first offender would be entitled to somewhat less punishment
than would be deemed deserved in a hypothetical desert scheme that
disregarded prior criminality, but repeat offenders would lose this fa41
vored status.
We need not debate this issue further here, for it suffices to look to
what these two views have in common. Their common feature, of
course, is that they restrict the role of prior criminal record. On either
theory, a scheme that gives heavy or predominant emphasis to prior
42
criminality would not comport with desert.
D.

CARDINAL PROPORTIONALITY:

WHAT IS A "REASONABLE"

PROPORTION?

Cardinal proportionality, as explained earlier,4 3 requires that a reasonable proportion be maintained between the absolute quantum of
punishment and the gravity of the criminal conduct. The scale should
not be so inflated that lesser criminal conduct is severely punished, nor
should it be so deflated that grave offenses are punished leniently. The
44
question of cardinal proportionality has not received much attention,
45
but I have suggested an argument for why such a requirement exists:
The penalty scale ought not be inflated so much that non-serious crimes
also receive severe penalties (severe, that is, in [the] sense of being very
unpleasant, given the prevailing tolerances for suffering). Severe punishments for non-serious offenses overstate blame: the offender is being
treated as more reprehensible than the harmfulness of his acts (and the
extent of his culpability) justify. This objection holds even if the whole
40 The point is explained more fully in von Hirsch, DesertandAevious Convictions, supra note
38, at 601-02, as follows:
Although it would be wonderful if people's moral inhibitions were strong enough to keep
them from wrongdoing at all times, we know that even those who ordinarily refrain from
misconduct may have their self-control fail in a moment of weakness or wilfulness. We
wish to condemn the person for his act, but accord him some respect for the fact that his
inhibitions against wrongdoing have (to our knowledge) functioned on previous occasions, and show some sympathy for the all-too-human frailty that can lead someone to
such a lapse. This we do by showing less disapproval of him for his first misdeed. . . .In
so doing, we distinguish-in the degree of our willingness to disapprove-between (1) the
actor who on one occasion has committed a wrong but has previously maintained his
inhibitions against such conduct, and (2) the actor who consistently has failed to show
self-restraint. With the latter, more than a momentary lapse is involved. As the act
becomes more typical of the way he has behaved, we become more ready not only to
judge the act to be wrong, but to visit our disapproval on him for that act.
41 Id. at 613-15, 622-23.
42 Id; see infra text accompanying notes 101-02.
43 See supra text accompanying note 19.
44 The available discussions are DoING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 91-94; J. KLEINIG, supra
note 15, at 110-133.
45 DOING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 91-92.
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scale has been elevated so much that the penalty ranks low in comparative
harshness alongside other penalties. Irrespective of other penalties, when
an offender has been visited with much suffering, the implicit condemnation is great. Punishing someone with several years' imprisonment--once
the painfulness of that sanction is understood--connotes that he must be
very reprehensible to deserve that; and if other transgressors are made
to
46
suffer more, that only implies that they are still more blameworthy.
The notion of a "reasonable proportion" between the gravity of the
crime and the absolute magnitude of its punishment is, however, an imprecise notion. One needs to decide whether the cardinal-proportionality requirement leaves room for other considerations in deciding among
alternative proposed magnitudes-of-scale, and what those other considerations might be.
Suppose that, as a member of a sentencing commission, one is writing guidelines for the decision whether or not to imprison (the "INOUT" decision). Suppose the rulemaker is using a two-dimensional
grid for its standards, with an index of seriousness of crimes as the vertical axis and a criminal history index as the horizontal axis. 4 7 Here, one
should have little difficulty deciding that less serious conduct, in the
lower area of the grid, does not deserve a severe sanction and hence
should not be punished by imprisonment. One should, similarly, be
able to decide that the most reprehensible conduct, in the grid's upper
area, deserves a severe penalty such as imprisonment. 48 This can be
pictorially represented as in Figure 1. Thus, the standards must be written in such a manner as to ensure imprisonment in the upper shaded
area, and to avoid imprisonment in the lower shaded area.
The problem will be to decide where, between these upper and
lower ranges, the IN-OUT line should be drawn. Should it be closer to
(but not touching) the upper shaded area? Or closer to the lower
shaded area? Or just at the median point between them? The notion of
a reasonable proportion between the gravity of the crime and the severity of its punishment is not precise enough to furnish a ready answer.
Any of these proposed locations for the IN-OUT line would seem consistent with cardinal proportionality. It thus seems proper to invoke nondesert considerations to help decide the issue. 4 9 But which
considerations?
46

Id.

For fuller discussion of the use of such two-dimensional grids, see infia text accompanying note 90. Note that in a desert model, the horizontal axis would be solely a criminal
history score, rather than an "offender score" comprising the criminal record plus other information concerning the offender's background. See infra text accompanying notes 91-95.
48 von Hirsch, Utilitarian Sentencing, supra note 13, at 788-89.
49 Id.; DOING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 96-97.
47
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FIGURE I
REQUIREMENTS OF CARDINAL PROPORTIONALITY FOR

IN-OUT

STANDARDS

.:Imprisonment Clearly Deserved

CRIME
SERIOUSNESS
SCORE

...Imprisonment Clearly Undeserved:.-.'
Low
CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE

Should crime prevention be introduced to decide magnitude questions where the desert principle leaves the choice open? Some crimecontrol strategies would have to be ruled out because they would upset
the internal ordering of penalties on the scale; this would be true, for
example, of a predictive strategy. 50 Not all crime-control rationales
would present this problem, however. A deterrence strategy might be
used, for example, to decide the elevation of the IN-OUT line between
the shaded areas in the preceding figure, without affecting the relative
ranking and spacing of penalties.5 1 In DoingJustice, I did in fact suggest
just this: that where the commensurate-deserts principle was indifferent
as between two possible magnitudes-of-scale, opting for the scale having
52
the greater deterrent usefulness would be appropriate.
Given the limitations of our knowledge, however, I now doubt
whether we can rely on crime-control considerations in this fashion. As
will be apparent below, it is not even possible to gauge reliably the deterrent effects of changes in penalty levels for particular offense catego50 This is because a predictive rationale requires one to decide comparative severities on
the basis of risk, rather than on the basis of the gravity of the criminal conduct. See infra text
accompanying notes 91-109.
51 This assumes we are using deterrence to help decide sIstem-wide severity levels. However, an exemplary-punishment strategy that picked out selected offenses or offenders for enhanced punishment solely on the basis of the expected deterrent effects would infringe on the
parity and ordinal-proportionality requirements of desert.
52 DoING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 93 n.*.
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ries. 53 It is thus unlikely that we are, or shall in the foreseeable future
be, in a position to judge the systemwide deterrent effects of increasing or
decreasing by a few notches the severity of the penalty scale as a whole.
What other considerations might be used? The Minnesota sentencing guidelines set an interesting precedent: to rely on the availability of
penal resources. Minnesota's sentencing commission made existing
prison capacities decisive of the aggregate use of imprisonment under
the guidelines. 54 Desert was then invoked to decide the distribution of
these resources-that is, to decide which defendants should be sent to
prison and for how long. This meant the slope of the IN-OUT line was
decided by reference to desert principles, and hence was made fairly flat
so as to give greater emphasis to the seriousness of the crime than to the
criminal record. 55 The elevation of the line on the scale was based on the
availability of prison space. Since prison space was limited, the line
came to be located fairly high so as to imprison chiefly those convicted
of serious offenses such as those involving actual or threatened
56
violence.
This technique seems sensible enough for Minnesota, which historically has exercised restraint in the construction and use of prisons. 57 But
what of a jurisdiction that happens to have been prodigal (or frugal) in
the extreme about the use of prisons? If availability of resources is relied
upon in an extremely "prodigal" or "frugal" state, might not the result
be imprisoning the majority of felony offenders or almost none of them?
We might begin to resolve this problem by combining considerations of resource availability with normative judgments about cardinal
proportionality. Drawing the IN-OUT line on the basis of availability
of prison resources would be only the first step. Then, the rulemaker
would examine whether the line, thus tentatively located, is consistent
with or infringes cardinal-proportionality constraints.
Suppose the state has extremely little prison space that meets constitutional standards. In that event, an IN-OUT line drawn on the basis
of existing prison resources would be crowded high into the upper portion of the grid, as shown on Figure 2.58
53 See infira text accompanying note 83.
54 von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelinesfor Sentencing, supra note 4, 176-80.
55 This is a somewhat simplified description. For a fuller discussion, see id., 181-91; infra

text accompanying notes 107-08.
56 von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelinesfor Sentencing, supra note 4, at 181-91. (Note that the
Minnesota grid has a different format, with the least instead of the most serious offenses at the
top of the grid.)
57 Id. at 179.
58 Note the relatively "flat" slope of the line, reflecting a desert rather than a predictive
model for allocating the available prison space. This issue is discussed more fully supra text
accompanying notes 36-42; infra text accompanying notes 101-06.
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FIGURE 2
EXAMPLE OF EXCESSIVELY LENIENT IN-OUT LINE:
RESOURCES NEEDED
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Line ab is proposed IN-OUT line
Examining this line, the rulemaker could make the judgment that it is
unacceptable. By impinging on the upper shaded area of the grid, it
59 The line is so
infringes the requirement of cardinal proportionality.
high that very serious crimes, manifestly deserving of severe punishment, will not be penalized by imprisonment, and will have to receive
lesser sanctions. The sentencing commission should recommend the
funding of additional prison space, so as to lower the IN-OUT line be-

low the shaded area.

Suppose, conversely, the jurisdiction has relied heavily on imprisonment and thus has extensive prison facilities. In that event, an IN-OUT
line drawn on the basis of available space could drop far down on the
grid, as shown on Figure 3. Examining this proposed IN-OUT line, the
sentencing commission should again judge it unacceptable. It likewise
infringes cardinal proportionality by impinging on the lower shaded
area. The line is placed so far down that not only serious crimes but
intermediate and lesser offenses would be punished by the severe sanction of imprisonment. The commission should in that event decide on a
less-than-full utilization of available prison space so as to raise the INOUT line above the shaded area.
59

nots 47-48.
.upra
accompanying
text .e

.4
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FIGURE 3
EXAMPLE OF EXCESSIVELY SEVERE
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line cd is proposed IN-OUT line
Suppose, finally, the situation is similar to Minnesota's. Locating
the IN-OUT line on the basis of available prison space would place it
between the two shaded areas, as shown on Figure 4.
FIGURE 4
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In that event, the rulemaker would not be violating cardinal-proportionality constraints by relying on resource availability for deciding the
aggregate amount of imprisonment to be used.
Does this provide a unique solution? Manifestly, it does not. The
IN-OUT line in Figure 4 could be raised or lowered somewhat without
impinging on the prohibited shaded areas. But as a practical matter,
making a case for raising or lowering the line in this fashion will not be
so easy. The high cost of prison space (as well as notions of parsimony 6° )
would militate against lowering the line so as to send more people to
prison. Political constraints are likely to militate against raising the line
so as to make the system more lenient. 6 ' In practice, there is likely to be
less ambiguity about the decision than there would be in theory.
It should be emphasized that the foregoing reasoning holds only for
decisions about the absolute magnitude and anchoring points of the
penalty scale. Once the decision about the appropriate elevation for the
IN-OUT line has been made (with whatever imprecision and even arbitrariness that decision may involve) the rulemaker becomes bound by
the much more definite internal scaling requirements of desert-that is,
by the requirements of parity and ordinal proportionality. The imprecision involved in deciding the elevation of the IN-OUT line would not
justify tilting the slope of that line so as to give predictive rather than
62
desert considerations primacy in the relative severity of punishments.
Nor would it justify treating desert constraints as mere outer boundaries
within which individual defendants' punishments could be varied on
utilitarian grounds as the neopositivists have proposed. 63 Once the INOUT line has been fixed, cases above the line should get prison
sentences and cases below it should get lesser penalties, except in special
60 DOING JUsTIcE, supra note 5, at 136.

61 von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelinesfor Sentencing, supra note 4, at 180.
62 See infra text accompanying notes 103-04.
63 von Hirsch, Ultilitarian Sentencing, supra note 13, at 788-89. In his most recent book,
Norval Morris blurs this essential distinction. N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW 179-209 (1982). Morris quotes, id. at 203, a passage in which I assert that utilitarian
considerations might properly affect decisions about the magnitude of a penalty scale, von
Hirsch, UtilitarianSentencing, supra note 13, at 788. This, he says, means I am somehow conceding that desert is merely a limiting principle in deciding relative severities of punishment.
It means no such thing. Instead, I am suggesting that although desert provides limits rather
than unique answers in fixing the penalty scale's absolute anchoring points, it should be the
decisive principle in fashioning the internal structure of the scale-that is, the comparative severities of punishment within the scale. Id. at 789. To decide comparative severities in part on
utilitarian grounds, as Morris is proposing, still violates the requirements of parity and ordinal proportionality.
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cases where there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances involving
increased or reduced harm or culpability.
The foregoing thoughts about cardinal proportionality are a tentative sketch, at best. Much more debate is needed before an adequate
theory of cardinal proportion evolves.
IV.

EVALUATING A FORMAL SENTENCING STRUCTURE
IN DESERT TERMS

If desert imposes the three requirements of parity, ordinal proportionality, and cardinal proportionality, how does one determine whether
and to what extent a formal sentencing structure meets these requirements? Here are some suggestions.
A.

ASSESSING A SYSTEM'S DESERT-PARITY

The best way of gauging parity in the desert sense would be to
assess the seriousness of various crimes, and then (holding the criminal
history constant) to determine the extent to which the system calls for
similar penalties to be imposed on those whose crimes have the same
seriousness-rating. This is not now feasible, because it would require
agreed-upon criteria for rating seriousness. 64 There are, however, some
alternative approaches to assessing parity.
Consider, first, a jurisprudential analysis of a system, that is, an
analysis of the system on its face. A formal penalty system will designate
certain factors that decide the normally recommended disposition. If
the system has a two-dimensional grid, those factors will be the offense
score and the various factors which, taken together, comprise the offender score. 65 In a system which has no grid, identifying the factors
which determine the normally recommended disposition will still be
possible. In California's system, for example, these are the type of crime
of which the offender is convicted and certain "enhancements" based on
violence or property loss in commission of the present crime and on the
prior criminal record. 66 Once one identifies the determinative factors,
one can examine whether and to what degree they relate to the seriousness of the criminal conduct (or to the extent and gravity of his past
criminal record). To the extent those factors are not so related, persons
whose criminal offense (and criminal history) are the same can receive
unequal sentences. Once this is done, the same analysis can be per64 See supra text accompanying notes 20-27.

65 For a discussion of the structure of a sentencing grid, see infra text accompanying note
90.
66 For a description of the California statute, see Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing
in California: The New Numbers Game, 9 PAC. L. J. 5 (1978).
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formed on the aggravating and mitigating factors that warrant a departure from the normally recommended sentence. To what extent do
these concern the harm or culpability of the criminal conduct? To what
extent do they relate instead to future criminal conduct or administrative concerns? The more those factors are desert-related, the more they
help ensure that those whose conduct is equally blameworthy will receive equal punishments.
Another matter that can be examined jurisprudentially is the
breadth of the offense categories. The broader the categories are, the
more they may cover conduct that varies in its degree of seriousness (unless some mechanism is provided in the guidelines for distinguishing the
conduct's seriousness within these broad categories).67 This has been a
problem particularly in California and in some other states where the
68
legislature has set the sentencing standards.
In studies of the system in actual operation, some statistical measures are possible. One method is to identify subgroups of offenders who
have similar current offenses and similar criminal histories. Within such
subgroups, one can then examine (1) to what extent offenders receive
similar dispositions, and (2) .what factors best account for any differences. This technique requires the evaluator to judge similarity, but it
obviates the need for formal seriousness-rankings. 69 We can expect to
find some differences of outcome within the subgroups. Much of the
point of the research would be to examine those differences closely, to
aetermine which features of the cases might account for them, and to
ahalyze whether and to what extent those features are germane to desert. The latter analysis can be done qualitatively, by arguing the pros
and cons of whether a given item bears on harm or culpability.
In field studies of the system's operation, one can assess whether
and to what extent decisionmakers explicitly consider questions of desert-parity when they decide penalties. To what extent do decisionmakers in individual cases compare the proposed disposition for the
particular case with dispositions for other cases that seem as serious, or
more or less so?
B.

ASSESSING A SYSTEM'S ORDINAL PROPORTIONALITY

To assess ordinal proportionality, one ideally would need, again,
agreed-upon criteria for the seriousness of crimes and for the severities of
67 The new Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines, for example, subcategorize the broadest
offense categories such as robbery and burglary. Penn. Sentencing Guidelines § 303.8, reprintedin 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 431 (1982).
68 von Hirsch, Constructing GuideliesforSentencing, supra note 4, at 193.
69 It also eliminates the need for deciding what weight should be given prior convictions,
since only those offenders with similar criminal histories are being compared.
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punishments. In the absence of such measures, 70 what proxies can be
devised?
As an illustration, let us consider the Indiana sentencing code.
Todd Clear 71 has estimated that, were the code implemented as written
in 1976, offenders would serve time according to the scale set out in
Table 1.
TABLE 1
INDIANA PENALTIES

Crime (First Offense)
Rape
Armed Robbery
Unarmed Robbery
Burglary
Theft

Duration of Confinement
11.0 years
4.9 years
4.7 years
3.8 years
1.2 years

To determine whether this scale satisfies the requirements of ordinal
proportionality, one would need to examine whether the penalty for any
crime on the scale is "out of line" in any of the following senses:
-Does any crime receive greater punishment than offenses that are more
serious, or lesser sanctions than offenses that are less serious?
-Is the sanction for any crime "crowded" too close to the sanctions for
other crimes that are substantially more or less serious?
Assuming one lacks formal criteria of seriousness, one might try to answer these questions as follows.
One could begin by inspecting the scale visually and picking out
those penalties that intuitively seem to be out of line. Using this intuitive test on the Indiana scale, no crime is obviously misplaced in rankorder, but some spacing decisions do appear odd. One is the almost minuscule space between unarmed and armed robbery. Another is the relatively small step-up between burglary and robbery. The next question
would be: can one justify these spacing decisions?
In answering, one might consider Richard Sparks' suggestion: that
in assessing the harm component in the seriousness of crimes, we look to
the actual consequences and risks of criminal acts. 72 While systematic
empirical studies of the kind Sparks suggests are unavailable, one could
make qualitative comparisons beween crimes.
Take, for example, the Indiana Code's treatment of unarmed versus
See supra text accompanying notes 20-27.
Clear, Hewitt & Regoli, supra note 30, at 442. For a critique of the Indiana sentencing
statute, see von Hirsch, The New Indiana Sentencing Code, supra note 30.
72 See supra text accompanying note 24.
70
71
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armed robbery. If one considers the threatened harm, armed robbery
(which in that state is defined as robbery with any "deadly" weapon,
including a knife as well as a gun 73 ) seems substantially the more serious
offense: the threat is of deadly force. The degree of fear instilled in the
victim can be expected to be correspondingly greater. Seriousness, of
course, is a function of culpability as well as harm. But it is difficult to
see differences in culpability that would offset this substantial apparent
difference in threatened harm; both are intentional offenses, ordinarily
with few mitigating factors. One might try to pursue this qualitative
comparison further by bringing to bear any available data from victimization surveys. But the conclusion is likely to be that the gap in seriousness between armed and unarmed robbery is substantially greater than
that reflected by the very narrow penalty-difference in Indiana's punishment scale. If so, ordinal proportionality appears to have been
infringed.
The other question raised by visual inspection of the Indiana scale
is the treatment of burglary versus robbery. The prescribed prison term
for burglary is about eighty percent of that for robbery. Again, one
could try to analyze the harm and culpability involved in the two offenses. Robbery involves threatened violence, coupled wit'h a substantial risk that actual violence may occur. Burglary ordinarily involves
theft, invasion of privacy, and the generation of some sense of personal
insecurity. But the burglar ordinarily does not intend to confront the
victim or threaten violence, and the risk of personal injury occurring is
ordinarily much smaller than it is in robberies. (The latter point might
be checked by examining data in victimization surveys about the incidence of actual violence in burglaries and robberies.) One could pursue
this kind of analysis further, but the likely conclusion is that the seriousness-distance between the two offenses is greater than that recognized by
Indiana.
A weakness in this procedure is its first step. To the extent the scale
has ranking problems that do not appear on visual inspection, those
problems would not receive the scrutiny of the subsequent steps. One
could avoid this first step by examining each penalty in relation to those
above and below it. That would, however, be a laborious process. The
first step is thus a short-cut, but one that risks overlooking something.
The issues become slightly more complex when the scale is twodimensional, with one axis being the current offense and the other being
the prior offenses. If, in such a two-dimensional scale, a first offense of
robbery gets less than a third burglary, is that result ordinally disproportionate? The answer would depend on the criteria being applied with
73 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979 & Supp. 1982).
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regard to the weighing of prior criminal conduct.7 4 What one could do,
however, is to see whether there was any misalignment in the scale when
prior record was held constant. In other words, one could inspect each
vertical column on the matrix to see whether there was any misranking
or misspacing within that column.
Assuming the system, on its face, satisfies these approximate tests of
ordinal proportionality, one can then statistically examine the distribution of penalties as they actually are imposed. In addition, field studies
can examine the degree to which decisionmakers consider questions of
ordinal proportionality in their daily decisions to impose punishments.
C.

EVALUATING CARDINAL PROPORTIONALITY IN A SYSTEM

Can we say anything about this issue until a more fleshed-out theory of cardinal proportionality has been developed? Let us consider Indiana's penalty structure again. I have just suggested that the state's
prescribed term of 3.8 years' imprisonment for burglary is so close to the
prescribed penalty for the more serious crime of armed robbery as to
infringe ordinal proportionality. This, however, does not tell us whether
the proper solution is to keep the burglary penalty where it is and expand the penalty structure upward so as to give robbery and worse offenses still severer penalties, or instead, to compress the penalty structure
downward by reducing the burglary penalty and making suitable adjustments to other penalties further down the scale. To answer such
questions, we must inquire whether Indiana's scale meets requirements
of cardinal proportionality.
Indiana's scale does seem quite severe-particularly in its imposition of lengthy prison terms on intermediate-level crimes such as common burglary. We mightfee that such sanctions are disproportionately
harsh and hence wish to see the scale suitably reduced. Can we, however, give analytical content to this intuitive judgment?
If one examines that judgment, one finds that it contains three elements: (1) a judgment about the magnitude of penalties: the notion
that some penalties (including 3.8 years' imprisonment) are, and some
are not, severe in the absolute sense of depriving the punished person of
interests having critical importance in any human being's life; (2) a
judgment about the magnitude of crimes: the idea that some crimes do,
and some do not, invade interests that are of such critical importance;
and (3) an implicit judgment of what is, and what is not, an acceptable
norm of proportion: for example, should penalties that are cardinally
severe (in the sense of invading a person's fundamental interests) be reserved for crimes that do themselves invade the victim's fundamental
74 See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
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interests? When people disagree about cardinal proportionality they
may be differing about any one of these issues.
.

Cardinalseverity

What does it mean to say that Indiana's burglary penalty of 3.8
years' imprisonment is severe in a cardinal sense-that is, severe irrespective of where Indiana has put burglary on its penalty scale? One can
make sense of that judgment by looking at what interests of the offender
the sanction intrudes upon and how important those interests are. This
would entail both factual and moral assessments. The factual assessments involve such matters as these: (1) most people have only about
forty or fifty years of healthy adult existence, so that four years' imprisonment involves deprivation of a significant portion, perhaps as much as
one-tenth, of that existence; and (2) prisons are constricting, dangerous,
and boring places-so much so that four years' confinement is four years
of misery. The moral judgments involve such matters as the high value
we wish to place on personal liberty, which imprisonment so drastically
restricts. These constitute reasons for the conclusion that four years'
confinement is (cardinally) a severe penalty. Such a conclusion is not
indisputable, of course. Someone might argue that prisons are nicer
places, or that we overvalue personal liberty. But how plausible would
such claims be?
2.

Cardinalseriousness

Judgments of cardinal seriousness of criminal conduct may be
made in somewhat similar fashion. Seriousness, as discussed earlier, involves issues of both harm and culpability. The harm element can be
assessed by examining the importance of the interests infringed or
threatened by the conduct. With robbery, for example, the great importance of the threatened interest is obvious: the victim's physical wellbeing is put at risk. If we turn to burglary, it is not obvious that interests
of such central importance are infringed. The victim's life normally is
not directly threatened, and the risk of injury is relatively small. Property is often lost, but the individual's livelihood normally is not endangered. There is an invasion of privacy, although not one nearly as
pervasive and enduring as the loss of privacy and autonomy involved in
long-term imprisonment. Again, someone might dispute these assessments by producing evidence, for example, that the danger of personal
injury in burglary is greater, or by placing a higher valuation on the
kind of privacy-loss involved.
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The Norm of Proportion

Suppose one were to conclude that four years' imprisonment is cardinally severe, and that a first-time burglary is cardinally of only intermediate gravity. Is Indiana's penalty then acceptable? The answer
depends on the norm of proportionality one is willing to accept.
Cardinal proportionality, as suggested earlier, 75 does not furnish a
unique solution for the relation between crimes and their punishments.
But it does impose limits on what punishments are appropriate; for example, it would certainly rule out the use of severe punishments for minor crimes. Whether cardinally severe punishments are ever permissible
for intermediate-level crimes may be a somewhat more debatable matter. The evaluator, however, can set the stage by making explicit what
kind of proportionality-norm would have to be espoused in order to uphold Indiana's scale. By making clear that the scale uses a norm-ofproportion that visits severe punishment on offenses that are only of intermediate gravity, the evaluation can provide the basis for judgments
about the justice of this penalty scheme.

V.

DISTINGUISHING DESERT AND PREDICTIVE ELEMENTS IN A
FORMAL SENTENCING STRUCTURE

Formal sentencing structures typically represent a compromise
among diverse philosophical views. Some of the persons who shape the
system may be particularly concerned with imposing commensurable,
deserved penalties. Others are little concerned with desert and are primarily interested in maximizing the crime-control effectiveness of criminal penalties. The system tends to reflect these heterogenous views. If
one looks at California's or Minnesota's or other states' systems, one sees
some features which appear to be desert-oriented and others that are
explicable only on non-desert grounds. 76 Moreover, the drafters often
do not state the precise philosophical mix that is intended, or else state a
rationale that they themselves partially disregard, wittingly or not.
This heterogeneity makes it useful, when examining a formal sentencing structure in a particular jurisdiction, to try to assess what mixture of aims the structure reflects. To what extent can its features be
justified under the principle of commensurate deserts? To what extent
does it have features which infringe this principle and could be explained only on crime-control grounds? To answer such questions, one
needs a systematic account of how the desert and non-desert elements of
a system are to be distinguished.
75 See supra text accompanying notes 47-61.
76 von Hirsch & Hanrahan, DeterminatePenalty Systems, supra note 1, at 296-97.
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WHICH UTILITARIAN AIM?-FOCUSING ON PREDICTION

When a system diverges from desert requirements in favor of utilitarian aims, a variety of possible aims could be involved. This section
will focus on only one such aim: predictive restraint (or as it is now
sometimes called, "selective incapacitation"). Predictive restraint
means reliance on predictions of future criminal conduct to determine
whether, and for how long, a convicted offender is to be incapacitated
through imprisonment or other means of restraint. A predictively-oriented sentencing structure can be described because a limited capacity
to forecast criminal conduct does exist. Actuarial forecasting methods
have had some success in identifying offender subgroups having higherthan-average likelihoods of returning to crime.7 7 The prediction techniques rely on such factors as type of crime committed, prior criminal
78
record, age, employment, and drug history.
It should be emphasized, however, that these forecasting methods
are "successful" only in the restricted sense that they are not complete
failures-that is, they predict somewhat better than random selection
would. Existing prediction techniques account only for a small portion
of the variability in subsequent behavior outcome. 79 Their use in sentencing decisions would not be likely to have much impact on overall
crime rates.8 0 Moreover, they are plagued with problems of overpredic77 D. GO"-rFREDSON, L. WILKINS & P. HOFFMAN, GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND SENTENCING 41-67 (1978); Gottfredson, Assessment of Prediction Methods, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
PUNISHMENT AND CORRECTION 745-71 (N. Johnston, L. Savitz & M. Wolfgang 2d ed.
1970); Monahan, The Predictionof Violent CriminalBehavior: A MethodologicalCritique and Prospec-

tus, in

DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 244-69 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION]. For recent studies of "selective incapacitation," see J. CHAIKEN & M. CHAIKEN, VARIETIES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (1982); P.
GREENWOOD, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION

(1982).

78 See, e.g., Gottfredson, supra note 77.
79 See, e.g., D. GOTTFREDSON, L. WILKINS & P. HOFFMAN,

supra note 77, at 49.

80 Whichever sentencing rationale one chooses, one must bear in mind that the overwhelming bulk of cases do not result in apprehension and conviction for the crime committed.
The criminal justice system convicts too small a percentage of criminal offenders to offer
adequate leverage over crime rates. Levels of criminality respond, rather, to demographic and
social factors that cannot readily be influenced by the criminal justice system--such as the
percentage of youthful males in the population.
One prediction study, P. GREENWOOD, supra note 77, has promised striking crime-control gains through use of a "selective incapacitation" strategy. The Greenwood study develops criteria for identifying potential robbery offenders, derived from prisoner self-report
studies. Those criteria are familiar enough, because they much resemble those of earlier prediction research: they concern an offender's criminal record, drug involvement, and employment history. One assertion the study makes (hardly a new one) is that such criteria help
identify potential risks among felons facing punishment.
The novel claim in the Greenwood study, which has attracted extensive press attention,
is its promised reduction in overall rates of robberies. The study projects a 15% decrease in
aggregate robbery rates, without need for any expansion (indeed, with the promise of some
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tion: most of those identified as potential recidivists will in fact be "false
positives"-that is, persons who would not have been found to have of-

fended again had they been permitted to remain at large."'
The situation is different with respect to the other three utilitarian

rationales-deterrence, collective incapacitation, 82 and rehabilitation.
Here, the requisite empirical knowledge is lacking entirely. A recent
reduction) in prison populations. These projections are made on the basis of inferences about
the number and crime rates of offenders principally responsible for robbery in the community-inferences that are, on any close scrutiny, poorly supported and not particularly plausible.
Greenwood studied a sample of incarcerated robbers. On the basis of their self-reports of
past crimes committed, he types robbers into low, medium, and high-rate offenders; assigns a
robbery-rate to the members of each group; and then, using these assumed rates, estimates the
number of low, medium and high-rate robbers committing robberies in the community.
Through this technique, he "finds" that a limited number of high-rate robbers are responsible
for a large share of total robberies. Hence, identifying and incarcerating those he has identified as "high-risk" individuals would, he asserts, yield a large reduction in the overall rate of
robberies.
The manifest defect of this projection method is that Greenwood has made no effort to
study the activity of robbers in the community. He has merely studied the robbery rates of a
small and probably unrepresentative sample of robbers-to wit, those who happen to be incarcerated and whose self-reports thus can easily be obtained. His report indicates, id. at xvii,
that in California, the situs of his study, the probability of arrest and conviction for robbery is
.03, and the probability of incarceration if convicted for robbery is .86; consequently, the
probability of arrest, conviction, and incarceration for a given robbery is very small indeed:
only .0258. The sample Greenwood has studied thus may represent a minute portion of the
general population of robbers. Perhaps, as Greenwood supposes, committing more robberies
may increase the probability of arrest, conviction and incarceration-and hence of inclusion
in his sample. But that surmise, if true, may also mean that the sample is highly
unrepresentative in its members' robbery rates. If that is the case, to estimate the number of
robbers committing robberies in the community on the basis of the histories of members in
this sample is simply fallacious. The study embodies one of the classic fallacies in social science research: the drawing of conclusions about frequently-occurring behavior in the community on the basis of the behavior of a small and possibly unrepresentative sample of
individuals who have been removed from that community and whose histories thus can be
easily studied. For a fuller discussion of the Greenwood study, see von Hirsch & Gottfredson,
Selective Incapacitation: Some Queries About Research Design andEquity, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE (1983) (forthcoming).
81 N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 62-73 (1974); von Hirsch, Prediction of
CriminalConduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717 (1972).
Recently, John Monahan reviewed the major statistical and clinical studies of violence prediction and found that all such studies involved a high incidence of false positives. J.
MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR:

AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES

73-80, 101-04 (1981).
82 The term "collective incapacitation" refers to those incapacitative strategies that impose a given period of restraint on all persons convicted of a given type of crime without
attempting to predict which individual offenders are likely to recidivate. So long as some
(even if by no means all) of the offenders thus imprisoned would have committed new crimes
had they remained at large, this strategy will have an incapacitative effect by taking those
persons out of circulation for a portion of their criminal careers. This strategy is discussed in
J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 161- 82, 198-209 (1975); Shinnar & Shinnar,Efects of the
CriminaljusticeSystem on the Control of Crime: A QantitativeApproach, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 581
(1975); von Hirsch, Giving Criminals TheirJust Deserts, 3 CIv. LIB. REV. 23 (1976).
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report by a National Academy of Sciences panel concluded that present
research on deterrence has not reached a point which permits the magnitude of deterrent effects to be measured with any reliability. 83 The
report reaches a similar negative conclusion with regard to our ability to
assess collective incapacitation. 84 With respect to rehabilitation, it is notorious that little or nothing is known of what features of a sentencing
85
system might enhance or retard effective treatment.
By omitting these other crime-control aims, the analysis is necessarily incomplete. Many features of various states' formal penalty systems
may be explicable only because the drafters believed that those features
would, say, enhance the system's deterrent effectiveness. Since nobody
really knows what does or does not enhance deterrence, however, these
beliefs must be left aside for the moment.
B.

FROM DESERT TO PREDICTION:

FOUR MODELS

Penalty schemes can be arrayed along a spectrum, reflecting the
degree to which they seek to comply with the requirements of commensurate-deserts. At one end of the spectrum would be those schemes
which place preeminent emphasis on commensurability. At the other
end would be those systems that disregard commensurate-desert requirements and give paramount emphasis to predictive restraint. Within this
spectrum, it is useful to identify four distinct models for penalty systems
that differ from one another in the relative degree of emphasis they give
to desert and to predictive considerations.

I. Desert Model
A Desert Model is a penalty scheme that attempts rigorously to
observe the requirements of parity, ordinal proportionality, and cardinal proportionality (to the extent that cardinal proportionality is now
understood). Among those whose criminal conduct is equally blame83 DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supra note 77, at 15-63; see also C. TITTLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE: THE QUESTION OF DETERRENCE (1980); Brier & Fienberg,
Recent Econometric Modelling of Crime and Punishment: Supportfor the Deterrence Hypothesis?, in INDICATORS OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 82-97 (S. Fienberg &

A. Reiss eds. 1980); Ross, Intermpted Time Series Studies of Deterrence of Dinking and Driving, in
DETERRENCE RECONSIDERED: METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS 71-97 (J. Hagan ed. 1982).
84 DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supra note 77, at 64-75.
85 For evidence on the limited effectiveness of rehabilitative programs, see Report of the
National Academy of Science's Panel on Research and Rehabilitative Techniques, in THE
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 1-147 (L.
REHABILITATIION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS:
Sechrest, S. White & E. Brown eds. 1979). Beyond these general problems of effectiveness,
little research has been done on how the choice of treatment programs might affect sentencing
decisions. A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, supra note 17, at 32-33.
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worthy, no deviation in severity of punishment would be permitted on
account of risk of future criminality.
2.

Modified Desert Model

In this model, the principle of commensurate-deserts would continue to have the primary role in determining the relative severities of
punishment. Variations in the punishment of equally deserving offenders would be permitted on predictive grounds, but those variations
would be modest. Large departures from the requirements of parity and
ordinal proportionality would continue to be barred as unjust.8 6 The
model therefore represents a compromise, but one stressing
commensurability.
3.

Modified Predictive (Neopositivist) Model

The shift here is strongly away from desert and toward prevention
of recidivism. The offender's predicted future conduct would normally
determine the disposition, even when doing so would result in substantially unequal punishment of those convicted of similar criminal conduct, or would result in less serious crimes being punished more harshly
than more serious ones. The requirements of parity and ordinal proportionality, in other words, would largely be disregarded. The model
would, however, continue to apply outer limits barringgrossol disproportionate punishments; severe sanctions could not be used for trivial infractions, and manifestly lenient punishments would be ruled out for the
most serious crimes. Desert constraints would thus be relegated to providing extreme upper and lower bounds on the quanta of punishment.
The recent American Bar Association report on sentencing recommends
87
this approach.
4.

Predictive Model

Here, desert constraints would be disregarded entirely. The choice
of whether to incarcerate, and for how long, would be made purely on
predictive grounds. The system of indeterminate sentencing proposed
by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency's Model Sentencing
Act comes close to recommending this view. 88 One could, however, im86 A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, supra note 17, at 18-19; see also Monahan, The Case
for Prediction in the Modified Desert Model of CriminalSentencing, 5 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 103
(1982).
87 ABA TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 12.
For a critique of this view, see von Hirsch, UtilitarianSentencing, supra note 13. Norval Morris
has recently criticized the Task Force for giving desert too peripheral a role. N. MORRIS,
supra note 63, at 202-04.
88 Advisory Council of Judges, Nat'l Council on Crime & Delinq., Model Sentencing Act, 9
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agine a determinate-penalty system embodying the same rationale: presumptive dispositions would be based purely on predictive factors,
without regard to the gravity of the criminal conduct of which the of89
fender was convicted.
These four models will be useful, as the reader will see, as a heuristic device. They are not, however, exclusive: along the spectrum from
desert to prediction, there could be various other stopping places.
C.

DESERT VERSUS PREDICTION: WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE
FOR A SENTENCING STRUCTURE?

To highlight the difference between the desert and predictive elements in a system, let us consider systematically the guideline format
touched upon earlier-a system having a two-dimensional sentencing
grid. The vertical axis would be the offense score, addressing the character of the offender's offense. The horizontal axis would be the offender
score, representing aspects of the offender's prior criminal history, or
other offender characteristics deemed relevant to the sentence. The cells
of the grid would contain normally-recommended dispositions or
ranges. 9° The rationale underlying such a grid could lie anywhere along
the spectrum from a pure Desert Model to a pure Predictive Model,
depending on how the offender and offense scores are specifically defined and on what degree of influence each score has over recommended
sentences.
I.

Use ofNon-Crime Factors

Consider, first, the offender score, the horizontal axis of the grid.
The offender's criminal history-the number of prior felony convictions,
and perhaps also the number of prior misdemeanor convictions-is assigned a certain number of points. In addition, there may or may not be
points assigned to factors concerning the defendant's personal or social
history. One indication of a predictive orientation is the extent of use of
these non-crime factors. 91 Whereas desert is concerned with the blameCRIME & DELINQ. 337 (1963); Advisory Council of Judges, Nat'l Council on Crime & Delinq., Model Sentencing Act, 2d ed., 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 335 (1972).
89 Until last year, one might have been able to argue that such a scheme was unconstitutional on grounds that grossly disproportionate penalties constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment. After the Supreme Court decision of Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263 (1980), however, this argument can no longer so readily be made. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion asserts that virtually any degree of sentence severity, irrespective of
how seemingly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense, is constitutionally permissible.
90 A substantial number of sentencing and parole-release guidelines use this format. von
Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate Penalty ystem, supra note 1, at 305.
91 By "non-crime factors" I mean factors not concerned with the characteristics of, or
circumstances surrounding, the defendant's criminal conduct. Conceivably, some such fac-
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worthiness of the defendant's criminal conduct, predictive restraint permits use of any information about the offender that bears on his
subsequent likelihood of offending. That, as discussed earlier,9 2 includes
social status factors (e.g., education and employment) and certain personal characteristics (e.g., drug or alcohol dependence).
Someone subscribing to a predictive-incapacitative philosophy of
sentencing is not compelled to use such non-crime factors. Among
predictors of future criminality, there is considerable redundancy, as the
predictive factors tend to be intercorrelated. This enables one to choose
crime-related factors (principally, the defendant's criminal record) and
exclude the non-criminal factors while retaining some predictive
power. 93 Given the availability of this choice, the non-crime factors
may be excluded from the offender score; and that exclusion may rest on
grounds other than desert-for example, on grounds that social status
factors are too closely linked with race and class. The absence of such
factors in the grid, therefore, is no sure sign of desert orientation. But
where such non-crime factors are present, their presence is an indication,
albeit not by itself a decisive one, 9 4 of predictive orientation. This is
most obviously the case where the offender score has been expressly developed and tested as a predictive index. 95
2. Manner of Use of Current Offense
A desert rationale relies on the seriousness of the current offense.
The offense score-the vertical axis of the grid-should thus grade offenses according to the rulemaker's judgment of their gravity, with the
score increasing as the estimated harmfulness and culpability of the offense rises.
Prediction, by contrast, permits consideration of features of the current offense that have no bearing on its seriousness or that may even be
tors--e.g., youthfulness or extraordinary social deprivation-could be relevant to desert as
having bearing on the defendant's culpability. See infra text accompanying note 114. But one
could identify such exceptions by examining the context in which such non-crime factors are
employed.
92 See supra text accompanying note 78.
93 D. GOTTFREDSON, L. WILKINS & P. HOFFMAN, supra note 77, chs. 5, 7.

94 It is not decisive because other features of the system discussed in this section could
override it. Suppose the system's offender score relies heavily on such predictive factors. The
system may still be primarily oriented to desert if the offense-seriousness score carried the
predominant weight in determining sentence severity and this predictively-oriented offender
score influences dispositions only to a limited extent. See infra text accompanying notes 10102.
95 In the U.S. Parole Commission's guideline matrix, for example, the offender score was
based on such a predictive index. D. GOTrFREDSON, L. WILKINS & P. HOFFMAN, supra note
77, ch. 3. However, that predictive score has substantially less influence on those guidelines'
prescribed prison terms than the matrix's seriousness-of-offense score. Id at 144.

SENTENCING STRUCTURES

1983]

inversely related to its seriousness. To the extent that research shows
that certain types of crimes--even the less serious ones-are associated
with high recidivism rates, conviction for those types of crimes may be a
predictor of future criminality. The use of the current offense in a manner that does not comport with its seriousness is, then, an indicator of
96
predictive emphasis.
3.

Quaity of the CriminalRecord

It is, we noted above, 97 a matter of dispute whether the offender's
prior criminal record has any bearing on how much punishment he deserves. If prior criminal record is deemed to bear on an offender's
deserts, however, the relevant dimension of that record is its degree of
blameworthiness; and that depends not only on how frequent, but how
serious the prior offenses were. It has thus been suggested that the horizontal axis of the sentencing grid should reflect the "quality" of the
criminal record, that is, the gravity as well as the number of prior
crimes. 98

A predictive view, by contrast, would permit one to treat the criminal record. in a manner that has nothing to do with the degree of blameworthiness of the defendant's past choices. To the extent that lesser, but
typically repetitive, prior crimes are better predictors of recidivism than
more serious but less repetitive ones, offenders with records of such lesser
offenses could be restrained for longer periods, since they represent
greater risks. The extent to which the offender score focuses on aspects
of the prior criminal record that do not bear on the degree of its blameworthiness is, therefore, an indicator of predictive emphasis. For example, a former provision in the U.S. Parole Commission's offender score
deducted points for "age at first commitment": an offender who was
younger when first convicted and confined fared worse on the score. 99
Youthfulness at time of first commitment has been found to be somewhat associated with recidivism.' °°
I

Relative Weight Given Current Offense versus Prior Onses

This is, perhaps, the most important indicator. A desert model
places primary emphasis on the gravity of the offender's current offense.
96 Something akin to this was found in the U.S. Parole Commission's guidelines. According to the guidelines before recent changes, an offender lost a certain number of points on the
offender score-and therefore fared worse-if his current conviction was for check passing or
auto theft, two of the least serious Federal crimes, because these lesser offenses were statistically associated with higher recidivism rates. Id. at 50-51.
97 See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
98 von Hirsch, Desert and trior Convictions, supra note 38, at 615-16, 620-21.
99 D. GOTrFREDSON, L. WILKINS & P. HOFFMAN, supra note 77, at 50-5 1.

100 Id.
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The prior record has much more limited significance: on the FletcherSinger view, it would have to be disregarded entirely; on my own view,
the absence of prior convictions becomes a modest extenuating factor., 0 '
Consider the slope of the IN-OUT line on a sentencing grid, separating
prison from non-prison sanctions. Because the gravity of the current
crime, represented by the vertical axis on the grid, would carry the preeminent weight, the IN-OUT line would either have to be flat (the
Fletcher-Singer view) or only slightly sloped (my view). 10 2 This is shown
in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5
IN-OUT

LINE ON A DESERT MODEL

igh
IN
c

CRIME
SERIOUSNESS
SCORE

b

----....--------------

a

OUT

Low

fl

OI

OFFENDER SCORE

._

Dashed line -----(ab) is IN-OUT line on Fletcher-Singer view.

Solid line

-

(cb) is IN-OUT line on my view.

Under a predictive rationale, by contrast, the offender score would
carry the preeminent weight. Where that score has been explicitly devised as a predictive index, a predictively-oriented rationale would obviously require it to be emphasized. But the same holds where the
offender score reflects only the prior criminal history. That history, too,
has predictive significance-in fact, it tends to be the strongest single
indicator of likelihood of recidivism. 10 3 Where the aim is predict and
restrain, therefore, it is that dimension of the grid which should influ101 Se supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
102 For a fuller explanation, see von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions,supra note 38, at
621-26.
103 See supra text accompanying note 93.
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ence sentences most. This is shown' ° 4 in Figure 6.
FIGURE 6
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The evaluator can, by thus examining the slope of the dispositional
line, learn much about the implicit rationale of a sentencing system. A
similar analysis can be done with durations of confinement to determine
whether the seriousness dimension or the offender-score dimension has
greater influence on the progression of prison-term lengths from cell to
cell.' 0 5
It may be that the dispositional line is neither as flat as the desert
line shown in Figure 5, nor as steep as the predictive line shown in Figure 6. That suggests a composite conceptual model, in which both desert and predictive elements are present. In such a composite, the slope
of the line-its relative steepness or flatness-may suggest whether desert or predictive elements predominate.'O6
Line-dr'awing of this kind may also be useful for purposes of histori104 von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions, supra note 38, at 623-24.
105 For a discussion on how to conduct that analysis, see von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelines
for Sentencing, supra note 4, at 191-93.
106 For a discussion of the slope of the dispositional line under such composite conceptual
models, see von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions, supra note 38, at 626-29.
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cal comparison-i.e., to determine how much of a shift toward desert or
prediction has taken place through adoption of a formal sentencing
structure compared to practice before adoption of that structure. The
Minnesota guidelines are a case in point. The Minnesota IN-OUT line
is entirely flat in the left-hand portion of the sentencing grid, where
most of the cases lie. It slopes down sharply in the grid's right-hand
portion for persons with very long criminal records. 0 7 This represents a
rationale which emphasizes desert for the bulk of the caseload, and shifts
toward a more utilitarian approach for the relatively rare instances of
extensively repeated convictions.10 It is clear, however, that Minnesota's IN-OUT norms, taken as a whole, represent a substantial shift of
emphasis toward desert, as compared with earlier judicial practice.
Before enactment of the guidelines, the Minnesota sentencing commission's statistics suggest, judges ordinarily relied chiefly on the offender's
prior criminal record in deciding whether offenders should be
imprisoned. 10 9
5.

Aggravating/MiigatingFactors

Many formal sentencing structures have a list of aggravating and
mitigating factors. The decisionmaker in the individual case is authorized to depart from the normal penalty or range, if he or she finds such
factors to be present.l10 According to the parity requirements of desert,
special circumstances warrant departures from the normally-prescribed
disposition only if those circumstances bear on the harmfulness or culpability of the offender's criminal conduct."' On a predictive theory, by
contrast, any special circumstances would be relevant that bear on the
risk of recidivism posed by the defendant. Thus, one can go through
each listed aggravating and mitigating circumstance and ask: does this
relate to the harm or culpability? Or is it something that relates primarily to the likelihood of future crime?
This task will require a qualitative judgment. In some cases, the
answer will be fairly apparent: if provocation by the victim is listed as a
I2
mitigating factor, this relates to the defendant's degree of culpability;"
if "circumstances unlikely to recur" '" 3 is listed, that is plainly predictive.
Other cases will be closer to call. Sometimes, the same factor may have
107 von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelinesfor Sentencing, supra note 4, at 189-90. The line hinges
down at the right when one uses the grid format discussed here, instead of the transposed
format that state uses. See supra note 56.
108 von Hirsch, Constructing Guidelinesfor Sentencing, supra note 4, at 190-91.

109 Id. at 181.
110 See, e.g., R. SINGER,

supra note 15, at 75-95.

11 DOING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 100.
112 Id. at 80.
113 See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(2)(h)(1962).
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opposite significance depending whether it is used for desert or predictive purposes. Youthfulness, extraordinary social deprivation, and similar matters conceivably might be deemed mitigating factors on a desert
114
rationale, on grounds that they reduce the defendant's culpability,
but serve as aggravating factors on a predictive rationale because they
suggest a higher likelihood of recidivism.
6

Special Provisionsfor Dangerous Offnders

The presence of special provisions for dangerous offenders is, by
definition, predictive. They may take various forms. One form is a
schedule of enhanced penalties for offenders deemed to represent higher
risks. 115 Another form is the retention of indeterminate sentences for
116
offenders deemed especially violent.
7

ParoleSupervision

Most formal sentencing structures provide for the community supervision of offenders released from prison. Even those states that have
eliminated the parole board's power to release offenders from prison
usually retain a period of supervision of the offender after the expiration
of the prison term.' 17 Is retention of parole supervision a predictive, or
at least a non-desert, feature? That would depend on how onerous that
supervision is. Kathleen Hanrahan and I have suggested elsewhere1 18
that (1) there could not be parole supervision under a pure Desert
Model; 119 (2) parole supervision with modest sanctions against parole
violators would be permissible under a Modified Desert Model; and (3)
parole supervision with very intrusive conditions, or with potentially se114 Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of DoingJustice, 1976 Wis. L.
REv. 781, 805.

115 The Illinois sentencing code provides a schedule of extended terms, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-8-2 (1981), and gives judges broad authority to invoke these terms, at their discretion, for second felony offenders. Id. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2b (1981). The statute does not spell
out the purposes for which such longer terms may be imposed, permitting judges to use them
when they find the individual a bad risk. For a summary of the main provisions of the Illinois
law, see Bagley, Why Illinois Adopted Determinate Sentencing, 62 JUDICATURE 390 (1979).
116 An example is Oregon's indeterminate sentence for dangerous offenders, which is applicable to persons convicted of certain serious crimes if the court makes a special finding, after
psychiatric examination, that the defendant "is suffering from a severe personality disorder
indicating a propensity toward criminal activity." OR. REv. STAT. § 161.725 (1981).
117 For example, Minnesota has eliminated parole release for felons convicted under its
determinate-sentence statute, but provides for parole supervision during the last one-third of
the sentence, von Hirsch, ConstratingGuidelinesfor Sentencing,supra note 4, at 214 n.183. California likewise has eliminated parole release, but provides for parole supervision for specified
periods up to three years. CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 3000(a) (West 1982).
t18 A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, supra note 17, at 59-72.
119 But see R. SINGER, supra note 15, at 118-21.
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vere revocation sanctions, could stand only on a utilitarian sentencing
philosophy.
One thus should look at the potential burdensomeness of the conditions of supervision and at the severity or potential severity of the revocation sanctions for parole violators. The greater these are, the more the
system is oriented away from desert.
VI.

DESERT, PREDICTION, AND CONTROL OF DISCRETION

To what extent are limitations on sentencing discretion called for
by a desert rationale, or by a predictive one? Any theory-guided sentencing system needs dispositional standards in order to assure that individual decisionmakers will pursue that theory's goals, not others of their
own choosing. Standards also assure that decisionmakers will pursue
the prescribed goals in a reasonably consistent manner. The choice of a
sentencing philosophy bears on a different question-not whether there
should be standards, but what their content should be: what characteristics of the offense and the offender should determine the disposition, and
how specific those standards should be.
A.

DESERT AND CONTROL OF DISCRETION

A desert rationale is not, per se, addressed to the control of discretion. The principle of commensurate-deserts is concerned with the relationship between the seriousness of crimes and the severity of
punishments. Limiting discretion is germane to desert only as a means
120
to the end of rendering punishments more commensurable.
Standards are needed to implement a desert model in order to ensure that judgments of seriousness of crimes, and of deserved severity of
punishment, are made consistently. Judges or other individual decisionmakers may disagree with one another about the seriousness of various kinds of criminal conduct. To assure that similar conduct is rated
similarly in its seriousness, there should be standards establishing the
relative gravity of crimes. Individual decisionmakers may disagree, likewise, on how the defendant's criminal history should be rated, and how
much weight that history should be given; to assure consistent treatment
in this area, standards for assessing that history are needed. Individual
decisionmakers can differ, above all, in their views of what punishment
levels are appropriate, given the seriousness of the criminal conduct.
Therefore, there need to be standards that specify the quantum of punishment that is deemed deserved.
Desert theory does not, however, dictate just how detailed the rules
120

See von Hirsch, "Neoclassicism," supra note 7.
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should be, or how much residual discretion those rules should permit.
While the theory calls for equal treatment of "normal" cases of any
given offense, it also requires differentiation to be made when there are
special circumstances bearing on the harm or culpability of the conduct.
The structure thus needs a normally-recommended disposition or range
of dispositions for the normal cases, but flexibility to deviate from that
disposition or range in unusual circumstances. When one tries to embody such a complex structure in rules, one encounters the familiar dilemma. The more detailed the rules and the less room for discretionary
choices, the more cumbersome the system becomes, and the more it
tends to detail inappropriately and unjustly with unforeseen contingencies. The less the detail and the more interstitial discretion, the greater
is the risk of inconsistent treatment of similar cases. Some sensible compromise must be worked out.
The search for such a compromise is interestingly illustrated in
Minnesota's guidelines. Minnesota's solution has been to adopt a firm
dispositional line between imprisonment and lesser offenses, narrow
ranges of duration where imprisonment is the recommended sentence, a
fairly stringent standard for departing from these presumptive dispositions, but a rather wide leeway once departures have been justified. 121
Each of these decisions brings into sharp relief the major issues that one
must address when attempting to write sentencing standards on desert122
oriented principles.
B.

PREDICTIVE SENTENCING AND CONTROL OF DISCRETION

How much constraint on discretion is called for under a predictively-oriented rationale? The answer may be even more variable than
it is with desert.
In discussing a theory of predictive restraint, one must distinguish
between two questions. The first is the judgment of risk: what is the
likelihood of new criminality, what kind of criminality is expected, and
how long is the risk expected to endure? This is an empirical questionan inference from past behavior and known characteristics of persons to
their future conduct. The second is the judgment of what disposition
should be made once one has assessed the risk. This is a question of
policy, not of fact. It involves the value judgment of whether the need
to protect society from a given kind of predicted conduct is urgent
enough to warrant the deprivation of the offender's liberty. It also involves resource-allocation issues of what priority should be given to the
121 von Hirsch, ConstructingGuidelinesfor Sentencing, supra note 4.
122 The major issues before the Minnesota Commission are analyzed in id.
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prevention of various risks in a system having limited correctional
resources.
To answer the policy question, standards are needed in order to
ensure that the issues concerning values and resources are answered in
considered, consistent fashion. Without such standards, policy will be
set through divergent individual decisions. Some individual decisionmakers may, for example, decide to confine only offenders thought
likely to perpetrate violent crimes, whereas other officials, having different personal philosophies, may decide to employ their powers of predic23
tive restraint to confine potential minor offenders as well.'
Answering the first, empirical question depends on the relative efficacy of statistical versus clinical prediction. 2 4 To the extent that statistical prediction is superior, the predictive factors can be specified in the
guidelines and applied with little need for deviation in individual cases.
If the offender's criminal history and other predictive factors indicate
that he is in a high-risk category, he would simply receive the designated
term of confinement. Judges might not need to be given much power to
invoke special circumstances that suggest in qualitative fashion that the
defendant is a better or worse risk; such clinical judgments of risk may
not sufficiently enhance the accuracy of the statistical forecast. Special
aggravating and mitigating circumstances bearing on offenders' culpability could largely be disregarded on grounds that one is focusing on
risk, not blameworthiness. Thus, one could imagine such a predictivelyoriented system having narrowly-prescribed presumptive sentences and
little leeway for special circumstances. Such a system may seem
mechanical, but this might possibly enhance, not diminish, its predictive
usefulness.
Standards with wider leeway would be necessary under a predictively-oriented model only to the extent that "clinical" predictions enhanced predictive accuracy. If judges could, by making qualitative
assessments of defendants, foretell future criminality better than prediction tables could, then and only then would there be a need to add
substantial discretionary elements to the standards. The available evidence, however, generally does not appear to support this
25
supposition. 1
This suggests that the logic of prediction points exactly in the opposite direction from the traditional view of predictive restraint. The
traditional view was that wide discretion should be granted in order to
allow decisionmakers to fit the disposition to the risk posed by the de123 von Hirsch,supra note 81, at 725-26; see also, Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some
FictionsAbout Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24 (1970).
124 p. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954).
125 Monahan, supra note 77, at 257-61.
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fendant. 126 In fact, the contrary may be the case: predictive restraint
might best be achieved by detailed, narrowly-drawn-indeed, rigidstandards.
But even if thepreferred method of predictive restraint might involve
detailed standards, it is not the only method. Both statistical and
clinical predictions of recidivism tend to use similar informationlargely, the defendant's criminal record and a few items about his social
history. A more discretionary system-one that instructed judges to
base sentences on expected future conduct, and left them leeway on how
to forecast such conduct-might still have some success as a technique of
predictive restraint.12 7 The different judges in such a system might, concededly, exercise their discretion in such a fashion that defendants with
similar criminal and social histories would receive different dispositions.
But such disparity might be deemed more acceptable than it would
under a desert model. Parity requirements are, as noted above, an essential part of treating offenders commensurately with their blameworthiness. If blame and blameworthiness are downplayed or disregarded,
however, the only thing that remains is the efficacy of the system-plus
some generalized principle of equal treatment which, unlike the parity
requirement of desert, would permit inequalities to the extent they pro28
mote or support the utilitarian ends of the system.
The foregoing indicates that one cannot infer the implicit rationale
of a formal sentencing structure merely from the degree of specificity of
its rules. Either a desert-oriented scheme, or a predictively-oriented one,
can be written with more or less detail. What is critical for identifying
the purposes of a system is rather the type of features of the crime and/or
its perpetrator upon which the system relies.
VII.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The frenzied pace of legislative activity on sentencing in the midseventies 29 has now (mercifully) slowed. A retreat to the wholesale sentencing discretion that existed a decade ago is, however, unlikely. Formal sentencing structures seem to be here to stay. There may be a
change in rulemakers, as states become disenchanted with legislative
standard-setting and come to prefer sentencing commissions or other
126 See D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 43-81 (1980).

127 Even such an advocate of statistical prediction as Greenwood has suggested that judges,
in making discretionary sentencing decisions, may have some success in predicting recidivism.
Petersilia & Greenwood, Mandatory Prison Sentences: Their ProjectedErcts on Crime and Prison
Populations, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604, 615 (1978).
128 Morris, supra note 11, at 267.
129 von Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate Penalty Systems, supra note 1, at 315-16.
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specialized rulemaking bodies.130 Systems of sentencing rules written
with some sophistication and concern for the availability of correctional
resources are more likely to survive than are coarser efforts.' 3 1 But in a
significant number, if not necessarily the majority, of American jurisdictions, standards or guidelines for sentencing decisions will continue to
3 2
develop, survive, and change.'
One can thus expect continued debate on what rationale those
standards should embody. Several American jurisdictions, including
Minnesota in its carefully crafted guidelines, have relied primarily on
desert.13 3 There has been newly revived interest in predictive sentencing. 13 4 But punishing offenders for expected future crimes raises disturbing ethical and evidentiary problems- 3 5 -disturbing enough, I
expect, to prevent a clear consensus from developing in favor of predictive sentencing. What one can more realistically anticipate is continued
competition between desert and preventive conceptions of sentencingwith varying mixes of these two conceptions influencing sentencing policy in various jurisdictions. There will thus continue to be a need for
evaluating sentencing standards in a manner responsive to the normative issues concerning commensurability and crime control.

130 Id. at 299-309.

13 Id. at 296-98.
132 An indication of this continuing activity is the creation in 1981 of a sentencing commission for the state of Washington. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.040 (Supp. 1982). The
commission had been drafting its sentencing guidelines while this article was being written.
133 von Hirsch, Construcing Guideinesfor Sentencing, supra note 4. The guidelines recommended by Washington's sentencing commission are likely also to emphasize desert.
134 See, e.g., P. GREENWOOD, supra note 77.
135 For a sketch of the evidentiary problems, see supra note 80 and text accompanying notes
79-81. For a discussion of the ethical problems of predictive sentencing, see von Hirsch, Uifitarian Sentencing, supra note 13.

